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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
I Aim of dissertation 
The concept of good faith has been in existence for a long period of time.1 It has been used over 
the years to describe both the contractual relationship that the parties should aspire to have and 
the manner in which the contract must be executed.2 A number of legal systems, however, 
consider good faith to apply to the law of obligations generally, and that it is not limited to 
contract law.3 Despite having this important role, finding a precise definition of good faith has 
been a formidable task.4 This is largely because of its elusive nature, which has led to differences 
in what it is understood to mean and in approaches to its application both in national contract 
laws and international trade instruments.5 
An international trade instruments that does not define good faith presents courts and 
tribunals with the difficulty of ‘gap-filling’ with reference to national laws with which they are 
most familiar or with which the parties have the closest connection.6 The underlying premise for 
this practice is argued to be that: 
‘In our world of positive transaction costs and bounded rationality, parties cannot write 
complete contracts specifying a suitable provision for every possible state of the world.’7  
However despite this rationale, gap-filling can undermine uniformity in the meaning and 
application of good faith in international trade instruments.8 Furthermore the application of good 
faith in international trade instruments is also subject to a degree of uncertainty.9 This can lead to 
an element at least of gap-filling with reference to national laws, in which there are different 
                                                 
1 Paul J. Powers ‘Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods’ (1999) 18 JLC 333 at 335.  
2 Ibid at 336. 
3 Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson et al European Contract Law: Materials for a Common Frame of Reference: 
Terminology, Guiding Principles, Mode Rules (2008) 151. 
4 Powers op cit note 1 at 333. 
5 Andrew Terry & Cary Di Lernia ‘Franchising and the quest for the Holy Grail: Good faith or Good intentions?’ 
(2009) 33 MULR 542 at 556. 
6 Mariana Pargendler ‘Modes of Gap Filling: Good Faith and Fiduciary Duties Reconsidered’ (2007-2008) 82 TLR 
1315 at 1318. 
7 Ibid. 
8 John Felemegas An International Approach to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales Law (2007) 9. 
9 Powers op cit note 333-334. 
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approaches to the application of good faith. 10  This can again undermine the objective of 
uniformity.11 
The objective of this dissertation is to ascertain whether it is possible to have a universally 
acceptable meaning of good faith and if indeed such a meaning can finally lead to uniformity in 
the application of the concept in international commercial transactions. It will be argued that 
such uniformity is possible but that it cannot be achieved without addressing the obstacles that 
have prevented a uniform adoption of the concept to date and how such difficulties can be solved 
in international trade. 
In answering the above question the dissertation will look into the meaning and application 
of the concept of good faith within international trade instruments, primarily article 7(1) and (2) 
of the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG);12 article 1.7 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles on International Commercial Contracts,13 and the Principles of European Contract 
Law (PECL).14 The purpose of considering these instruments is to identify the current difficulties 
in the meaning and application of good faith in international commercial transactions and how 
they can be addressed if uniformity is to be attained. 
Furthermore the dissertation will also examine the different definitions of good faith and 
the methods of application adopted by major European legal systems, particularly the German 
civil code,15 the Dutch civil code,16 the Uniform Commercial Code17 and the position in English 
law. The purpose for considering these domestic legislations is to identify the possible meaning 
and application that will be given to good faith in situations where courts and tribunals gap fill 
with reference to national laws.  
II Historical background 
Understanding the concept of good faith demands an understanding of its historical development. 
An obligation of good faith in commercial transactions was required as early as the Roman 
times.18 Its fundamental origin can be traced back to Christian norms of ethics and good behavior 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid at 9. 
12 The United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 1980. 
13 The UNIDROIT Principles on International Commercial Contracts, 2010. 
14 Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), 1998. 
15 Germany Civil Code of January 1, 1900. 
16 Dutch Civil Code of October 1, 1838. 
17 The United States Uniform Commercial Code, first published in 1952. 
18 Powers op cit note 1 at 335. 
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that require one to act in accordance with generally acceptable principles of good conduct.19 It is 
argued that the introduction of good faith into Roman law had been influenced by Greek writers 
such as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.20 A demonstration of the prominent position that good 
faith held in Roman contract law is in the contract of sale, where it led to the reception of the 
aedilitian remedies into the jus civile which in turn led to the amelioration of the harsh caveat 
emptor principle.21 In a broader sense, it is said that bona fides, as good faith was known during 
the Roman times, allowed the judge to consider error and duress in determining if either actio 
empti or venditi could be granted.22 In addition, the judge was able to consider a counterclaim 
arising from the same transaction and to condemn the defended only in the differences between 
the two claims.23 The obligation of contracting in good faith resurfaced in the period of the law 
merchant during the eleventh and twelfth centuries.24  
In the present day, the idea of performing a contract in good faith has been adopted in most 
jurisdictions, however the scope and application of the concept has differed depending on the 
legal system that governs the commercial transaction.25 The extent of the application of good 
faith is wider in civil law states where it is applied to both contract formation and performance; 
in contrast most common law states tend to adopt a narrow and focused good faith duty that is 
applicable only to the performance of the contract.26  
III Structure of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 examines the concept of good faith in international trade; this will be done by looking 
at its meaning as defined by scholars and other sources. These attempts at defining good faith 
will be examined in order to identify the problems relating to the meaning, context and role of 
the concept. This serve as a benchmark to answering the question discussed in this dissertation. 
Chapter three identifies the role of good faith in international trade instruments. This 
chapter will primarily focus on the contentious good faith provision in articles 7 (1) and (2) of 
the CISG and the good faith provisions in other international trade instruments such as the 
                                                 
19 Ibid at 334. 
20 John Eatwell & Murray Milgate et al The New Palgrave: a dictionary of economics (1987) 422. 
21 Reinhard Zimmermann Good Faith in European Contract Law (2000) 17. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Powers op cit note 1 at 334. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid at 335. 
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UNIDROIT Principles including a discussion on the PECL. The purpose of this chapter is to 
identify the current difficulties in the meaning and application of good faith within these 
instruments and how they can be addressed if uniformity is to be attained. 
Chapter four examines the concept of good faith as adopted in major national systems of 
law that include the German Civil Code, Dutch Civil Code, the US Uniform Commercial Code 
and English contract law. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the approaches that have been 
adopted by these domestic legislations which can perhaps be used in international trade 
instruments to bring harmony in the meaning and application of good faith.   
Chapter five will conclude that uniformity in the meaning and application of the good faith 
concept is possible. Furthermore, this chapter will identify the possible difficulties associated 
with the attainment of this objective drawn from the discussed international trade instruments 




CHAPTER 2 THE CONCEPT OF GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
I The meaning of good faith 
There have been several attempts made over the years by scholars and commentators to find a 
comprehensive meaning of good faith.27 A precise definition is, however, still not clear and the 
term is often described as ‘too vague and undefinable.’28 Despite this difficulty most definitions 
seem to capture the general essence of what good faith encompasses; for instance, in defining 
good faith, Vico used the definition given by the Black’s Legal Dictionary which provides that 
good faith is:  
‘…an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition and it 
encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of 
design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage, and an individual’s personal good 
faith is concept of his own mind and inner spirit and, therefore, may not conclusively be 
determined by his protestations alone.’29  
This definition continues to provide that in common usage good faith is: 
‘…ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from 
intention to defraud, and generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or 
obligation.’30  
Furthermore, the notion that good faith lacks meaning was also expressed by Neumann 
who argued that: 
‘The character of good faith is tied standards of morality, which are likely to change over 
time and which are different depending on whom holds the interest and which may be 
impossible to or ill-suited to being controlled by law.’31 
It can be argued from this definition that perhaps an unstable concept such as good faith 
does not have a place in international trade instruments which require ascertainable rules for the 
parties in international commercial transactions. 
In finding relevance for good faith in international commercial transactions, Powers 
defined the concept as: 
                                                 
27 Powers op cit note 1 at 350-351. 
28 Mary Keyes & Therese Wilson Codifying contract law: international and consumer law perspectives (2014) 64. 
29 Giambattista di Vico Universal Right (2000) 216. 
30Ibid.  




‘…an international doctrine that requires parties to an international transaction to act 
reasonably, as they would expect the other party to act.’32  
Such acts of the contractual parties that are to be construed as reasonable perhaps depend 
on the circumstances of each commercial transaction. Similarly O’Connor expressed the 
significance of good faith in international law by stating that the concept of good faith is: 
 ‘…a fundamental principle from which the rule pacta sunt servanda and other legal rules 
distinctively and directly related to honesty, fairness and reasonableness are derived, and the 
application of these rules is determined at any particular time by the compelling standards of 
honesty, fairness and reasonableness prevailing in international community at that time.’33  
These definitions indicate the significant role that good faith can have in a multinational 
setting despite its ambiguity.  
Furthermore, many scholars have argued that the most complete inclusive and earliest 
definition of good faith was possibly left by CICERO when he stated that: 
‘These words, good faith, have a very broad meaning. They express all the honest sentiments 
of a good conscience,  without requiring scrupulousness which would turn selflessness into 
sacrifice; the law banishes from contracts ruses and clever manoeuvres, dishonest dealings, 
fraudulent calculations, dissimulations and perfidious simulations, and malice, which under 
the guise of prudence and skill, takes advantage of credulity, simplicity and ignorance.’34 
It is noteworthy that all the above attempts at defining good faith convey a common idea of 
fairness, faithfulness and acting in a just manner that is expected from a reasonable contractual 
party. However, Pelletini argues, similar to Neumann, that despite the similarities in the 
definitions of good faith, any possible definition is subjective and reflects a specific origin, 
history and function of the concept in different jurisdictions and international trade instruments.35  
It may be argued based on the above that finding a definition of good faith is a 
formidable task therefore some scholars share the opinion that it is not possible to give the 
concept a definition.36 It is therefore argued that a better exercise would be to rather understand 
                                                 
32 Powers op cit note 1 at 352. 
33 John O’Connor Good Faith in International Law (1991) 124. 
34 Fauvarque-Cosson op cit note 1 at 152. 
35Cristiano Pettinelli ‘Good Faith in contract law: Two paths, two systems, the need for harmonization’ available at 
http://www.diritto.it/archivio/1/20772.pdf, accessed on 10 August 2015. 
36 Powers op cit note 1 at 334. 
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the concept by looking at the fundamental principles on which it is based.37 On this premise they 
firstly argue that good faith encompasses a duty to act:  
‘…fairly and equitably towards the other party.’38 
However there might be differences in determining the meaning of ‘acting fairly’ and 
‘equitably’ in commercial transactions therefore this determination may depend on the mode of 
behavior or way of thought of the judge or presiding officer.39 
Secondly, it is argued that good faith could be a duty which requires a certain level of ‘trust 
and confidence’ between the parties. 40  This principle of trust and confidence is also well 
established in the UK labour law, which provides that: 
 ‘Every contract of employment has an implied term in English law that the employer and 
employee will act with trust and confidence towards each other, even though such a term 
may be excluded by express terms.’41  
In stressing the importance of this principle the Employment Appeal Tribunal of England 
in the Morrow case42 held that:  
‘A finding that there has been conduct which amounts to a breach of the implied term of trust 
and confidence will mean inevitably that there has been a fundamental or repudiatory breach 
going necessarily to the root of the contract…’43 
Furthermore the position of mutual trust and confidence in the UK contracts of 
employment was addressed by the House of Lords in the Malik case,44 when Lord Steyn stated 
that: 
‘The evolution of the implied term of trust and confidence is a fact. It has not yet been 
endorsed by your Lordships’ House. It has proved a workable principle in practice. It has not 
been the subject of adverse criticism in any decided cases and it has been welcomed in 
academic writings. I regard the emergence of the implied obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence as a sound development.’45 
                                                 




41 Ravi Chandran ‘Fate of trust and confidence in employment contracts’ (2015) 27 SACLJ 31at 1. 
42 Morrow v Safeway Stores [2002] IRLR 9. 
43 Morrow supra note 27 para 9. 
44 Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1998] AC 20. 
45 Malik supra note 29 para 44-5. 
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This observation by Lord Steyn appears to indicate that the courts adopted a flexible 
approach to trust and confidence in law by basing their decisions on the considerations of ‘justice 
and policy.’46 Although this might be the right approach to follow in terms of national contract 
legislation, it can however be problematic in international trade instruments since there is a 
greater need for certainty in the latter instance because of the different national laws. 
Thirdly, it is said that good faith brings forth the establishment of a set of standards of 
reasonable behavior in contractual relations.47 It can be argued that the determination of such 
‘reasonable behavior’ that is established by good faith may require an inspection similar to the 
‘reasonable man test’ that is applicable in criminal law and in the law of delict or tort.48 In such a 
case, it perhaps requires consideration of whether the contracting parties carried out their 
contractual obligations in a way that accords with that of a reasonable contracting person in a 
commercial transaction under like circumstances. If the answer is affirmative, surely the 
standards of reasonable behavior of good faith may be considered to have been observed. 
Lastly, some scholars such as Pettinelli argue that the meaning of good faith is attainable 
by defining what constitutes ‘bad faith’, which is considered to be the easier to define than the 
former.49 Petinnelli’s argument is perhaps inspired by that of Associate Professor Summers who 
in 1968 argued that finding a meaning to good faith can be achieved by using the term as an 
‘excluder’,50 in other words, he noted that: 
‘It is a phrase which has no general meaning or meanings of its own, but which serves to 
exclude many heterogeneous forms of bad faith.’51 
 Summers went further by identifying six categories of bad faith in contract performance 
that include:  
‘the evasion of the spirit of the deal, lack of diligence and slacking off, willfully rendering 
only ‘substantial’ performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, abuse of a power to 
                                                 
46 Richard Stone & James Devenney Taxes, Cases and Materials on Contract Law 3 ed (2014) 247. 
47 Pettinelli op cit note 35 at 6. 
48 Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry ‘The Reasonable Person’ (2012) 87 NYULR 323 at 328. 
49 Pettinelli op cit note 35 at 6. 
50 Robert S. Summers ‘Good Faith in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial 




determine compliance, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's 
performance.’52 
The importance of identifying acts of bad faith to give a definition to good faith was 
expressed by Lord Scott in the Manifest Shipping case,53 when stating that: 
‘…Unless the assured has acted in bad faith he cannot, in my opinion, be in breach of a duty 
of good faith, utmost or otherwise.’54 
However, Professor Summers’s perspective on giving a meaning to good faith by using the 
term as an excluder has not gone without criticism.55 For example Patterson has argued that: 
‘The excluder analysis cannot work without the existence of a substantive notion upon which 
the excluder term does its work. Summers never supplies the substantive host, and for that 
reason alone his claims for the ‘felicity’ of the excluder analysis cannot be sustained.’56 
Additionally it can be argued that the excluder analysis can similarly not be adopted in the 
context of international transactions since the determination of what constitutes bad faith conduct 
will differ depending on the area of international trade that is governed by the international trade 
instrument.57 It can therefore be argued that his approach does not solve the problem of the 
elusive nature of good faith in international trade instruments since bad faith is also equally not 
readily ascertainable.58 
Professor Burton opposed the ‘excluder’ approach to good faith and articulated the 
‘forgone opportunities’ approach which provides that good faith could be defined through 
economic theory by examining the potential costs of a breach of an obligation.59 
Although it is more specific in finding a determination of good faith, such an approach 
may not be practical in international commercial transactions since the ‘forgone opportunities’ in 
                                                 
52  Paul MacMahon ‘Good Faith and Fair Dealing as an Underenforced Legal Norm’ available at 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60567/1/WPS2014-22_MacMahon.pdf, accessed on 10 August 2015. 
53 Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Shipping Co Ltd [2001] UKHL 111.  
54 Manifest supra note 36 para 111. 
55 Dennis M. Patterson ‘Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and Enforcement under 
Article Nine’ (1988) 137 UPLR 335 at 346. 
56 Ibid at 349. 
57  Emily Hough ‘the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A Nearly Empty Vessel?’ available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=622982, accessed on 13 September 2015. 
58 Ibid. 




international trade instruments may not be economically apparent. 60  This approach could, 
therefore, lead to further ambiguity if applied to international trade instruments. 
(a) The problem with the meaning of good faith  
The difficulty with achieving uniformity in the meaning of good faith is a result of several 
factors. The first problem is that such meaning often takes either a subjective or additional 
objective dimension.61 For example article 1-201 (19) of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C) 
originally defined good faith as: 
 ‘Honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.’ 
This is a subjective definition of good faith which is often referred to as a ‘pure heart and 
empty head’ standard.62  In his analysis of the subjective meaning of good faith in the U.C.C 
Volin63 argued that:  
‘The primary concern under the subjective theory of ‘good faith’ is whether the particular 
purchaser believed he was in good faith, not whether anyone else would have held the same 
belief.’64 
Furthermore he continues that:  
‘The test to determine whether one is acting in ‘good faith’ under this standard is what the 
particular person did or thought in the given situation and whether or not he was honest in 
what he did. Under this theory, a purchaser of goods must have actual knowledge of some 
other person's interest in the goods in order to be found lacking in ‘good faith’: Mere 
suspicion is not enough. Gross negligence is insufficient. Mere failure to inquire is not 
enough to impeach his title, although he must not shut his eyes to the means of knowledge 
which he knows are at hand.’65 
Whereas according to Volin the objective theory of good faith meaning entails that:  
‘…the trier of fact must determine what an ordinarily prudent man would have done or 
thought under the same circumstances. One's actual state of mind is no longer the critical 
                                                 
60 Leonard S. Volin ‘Uniform Commercial Code - Sections 1-201 (19), 2-103 (1) (b), 9-307 (1) – Good Faith 
Requirement for Buyer in Ordinary Course – Sherrock Brother v. Commercial Credit Corporation’ (1972) 14 BCLR 
343 at 345. 
61 Ibid at 347. 
62 Mark E. Wilson ‘What is Good Faith? Subjective and Objective Standards for Banks Accepting Payment Offers’ 
available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL130000pub/newsletter/201203/wilson-kerman.pdf, 
accessed on 5 October 2015. 





factor; one's innocence, suspicion or actual notice is no longer relevant. Instead, the inquiry 
goes to the prevailing community standards as to what is decent, fair or reasonable.’66 
Therefore Volin argues that a party who seeks to show his own good faith in terms of the 
objective test must:  
‘…not only demonstrate a lack of actual knowledge but must also show that he made the 
efforts which an ordinarily prudent businessman would have made in order to determine if 
any third party rights did exist. Even a negligent failure to ascertain third party rights could 
be a violation of the objective standard if the prevailing customs and practices in the trade 
would require a prudent businessman to ascertain these rights under the circumstances.’67 
Farnsworth argues that: 
‘Both common sense and tradition dictate an objective standard for good faith 
performance.68’ 
The objective meaning of good faith therefore imposes a stricter good faith requirement on 
a buyer while the subjective meaning requires only that the buyer be ‘unaware of any conflicting 
claims in the goods involved in the transaction.’69 Arguably if uniformity is to be achieved in the 
meaning and application of good faith a balance must be reached between the subjective and 
objective meanings of good faith. Such a balance can be achieved for example by including both 
the subjective and objective dimensions of good faith in a provision of an international trade 
instrument that seeks to define good faith. An example of such incorporation can be found in the 
1950 proposed draft of the U.C.C that had a general good faith provision in section 1-20170 
stating that:  
‘Good faith means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. Good faith 
includes observance by a person of the reasonable commercial standards of any business or 
trade in which he is engaged.’ 
The second problem with the meaning of good faith has to do with the context in which it 
is used. The meaning of good faith changes depending on the context.71 This point was made in 
the English Yam Seng case72 when it was argued that: 
                                                 
66 Ibid at 349. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Allan E. Farnsworth ‘Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness under the Uniform Commercial 
Code’ (1963) 30 UCLR 666 at 672. 





‘What good faith requires is sensitive to context.’73 
Furthermore it was argued that: 
‘…the content of the duty is heavily dependent on context and is established through a 
process of construction of the contract, its recognition is entirely consistent with the case by 
case approach favoured by the common law.’74   
Changing the meaning of good faith depending on the context of its usage may make it 
readily applicable for courts and tribunals. However this can present difficulties. Firstly, the 
constant changing of the meaning of good faith based on its context will arguably not ensure 
legal certainty in its definition. Furthermore, uniformity in the meaning of a legal concept is less 
likely to be attained if it changes continuously depending on the context. 
II The application of good faith 
The concept of good faith has not only been applied in contractual obligations, it has also found 
use outside the confines of contract law.75 The application of good faith outside contract law can 
be seen, for example, in the Netherlands where the concept is applied in the law of succession, 
bankruptcy law, company law and private international law.76 The application of good faith goes 
even further in German law where it is not only applicable in the whole of private law, but even 
extends to procedural law and administrative law.77 It is clear that good faith can find application 
in most fields of law but for the purposes of this dissertation the focus will be on contract law to 
determine if there is a possibility of uniformity in application.  
As a starting point, most European civil codes apply pre-contractual good faith that 
includes a duty to inform; furthermore such a duty also prohibits the parties from breaking off 
negotiations in a manner that is contrary to pre contractual good faith.78 Secondly, some legal 
systems apply good faith for interpretation of the contract and this role is contained either in 
statutory provisions on good faith interpretation and in other legal systems good faith 
interpretation has been established by the courts.79 The obligation of good faith interpretation can 
                                                                                                                                                             
72 Yam Seng Pte Limited v International Trade Corporation Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 [QB]. 
73 Yam supra note 72 para 141. 
74 Yam supra note 72 para 147. 
75 Martijn Hesselink ‘The Concept of Good Faith’ in Towards a European civil code 3 ed (2004) 471- 498. 
76Ibid. 
77Ibid at 485.   
78 Ibid at 479. 
79 Ibid at 480. 
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also be found in international instruments, such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
that provides: 
‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’80 
In some legal systems, good faith has a role of validating a contract, meaning that a 
violation of a good faith duty may lead to invalidity of a contract. This application of good faith 
is provided in a general good faith clause that can hold standard terms void on the basis of such 
clause.81 However, it is not a given fact that a violation of a good faith clause will surely 
invalidate a contract. This was the view in the English Gold case,82 where the court interpreted 
an express contractual good faith provision narrowly. It was held that:  
‘...good faith, whilst requiring the parties to act in a way that will allow both parties to enjoy 
the anticipated benefits of the contract, does not require either party to give up a freely 
negotiated financial advantage clearly embedded in the contract.’83 
It can be seen that the concept of good faith is applied in different stages of contracting. 
Despite such acceptance, however, the concept has also had a somewhat limited, or conditional, 
application in some international trade instruments and national legal systems. 84  This has 
resulted in restraint in the application of good faith.  
  
                                                 
80 Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1980. 
81 Hesselink op cit note 75 at 479. 
82 Gold Group Properties v BDW Trading [2010] EWHC 323 (TCC). 
83 Gold supra note 82 para 91. 
84 Powers op cit note 1 at 336. 
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CHAPTER 3 GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
The concept of good faith is found in international trade instruments either as an explicit 
provision or implied by the contractual terms between the parties.85 However, there is often 
uncertainty regarding the scope and extent to which either the contract or the relationship 
between the parties must adhere to the obligation to act in accordance with good faith.86 In this 
chapter, the dissertation will look at the different contentions regarding the inclusion of good 
faith in international trade instruments in an attempt to determine if there can be unification in 
the meaning and application of the concept. 
I United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods  
The main purpose of the 1980 Vienna Convention was to adopt a compromised uniform law on 
the international sale of goods. 87 Therefore the preamble of the CISG provides that the adoption 
of such uniform laws can contribute to the removal of legal trade barriers and thereby promote 
international trade.88  
There were three stages of development that led to the adoption of this convention.89 The 
first stage took place between 1970 and 1977, where the Working Group had nine sessions to 
draft the Convention.90 By 1976, they had completed and unanimously passed a draft Convention 
on the International Sale of Goods (Sales Draft), which set out the rights and obligations of 
buyers and sellers under sales contracts.91 The Working Group Draft on Formation of the Sales 
Contract (Formation Draft) was completed in 1977.92 In the second stage, the United Nations set 
up the UNCITRAL, which unanimously approved the 1978 UNCITRAL Draft Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. The final stage saw the adoption of the CISG in 
1980 and it was initially signed by eleven states.93 
During this process the inclusion of the good faith concept was subject to extensive debate 
amongst the drafters of the CISG.94 This was for different reasons. First, scholars have said that 
                                                 
85 Powers op cit note 1 at 335-338. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Larry DiMatteo (ed) International Sales Law – a Global Challenge (2014) 8.  
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid at 11. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid at 12. 
93 Ibid at 14. 
94 Powers op cit note 1 at 342-348. 
15 
 
there was a fear amongst commentators that there could be no general agreement on the meaning 
of ‘good faith’ in the context of international sale of goods.95 Secondly, there had been different 
opinions on the role that should be played by good faith, which ranged from the idea that it 
should be viewed as ‘an obligation present at all stages of the contracting process’ to the view 
that good faith ‘should not be explicitly mentioned in any provision.’96 A compromise on these 
contrasting views was reached by the provisions of article 7 (1) of the CISG. 
(a) Article 7 (1) 
The nature of the CISG as a multilateral convention means that a uniform application of its 
provisions is crucial. This goal of uniformity is reflected in the provisions of article 7 (1) which 
emphasise the ‘international character’ of the CISG. 97  Keily argues that this provision was 
essentially crafted to counteract the ‘homeward trend’ in interpretation; that is, ‘the risk that 
judges from different cultural and legal backgrounds are apt to rely upon individual national 
legal heritages.’98 Furthermore, it is argued that this provision was seen as an understanding 
between those who feared that the concept of good faith was vague and thereby took different 
meanings in various legal systems, and those who supported the use of a ‘broad standard to 
monitor inappropriate conduct.’99 An understanding of such points of view demands examination 
of the wording of article 7 (1). The article provides that: 
‘In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and 
to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in 
international trade.’ 
There has been an ongoing debate on the meaning and scope of applying the good faith 
concept in the CISG despite the inclusion of the concept in article 7 (1), 100 which has been 
variously described by commentators as an ‘awkward compromise’, a ‘strange arrangement’ and 
‘peculiar provision in the CISG’.101 The main concern expressed by scholars about this provision 
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is whether the phrase ‘the need to promote’ applies to the ‘observance of good faith’ as well as 
‘uniformity.’102  
Furthermore, it is argued that the provision of good faith in article 7 (1) extends only to the 
interpretation of the CISG and not to contract performance.103 It therefore does not directly 
impose an obligation of good faith on the contracting parties.104 This could be because good faith 
was initially perceived as a concept that could have a limited impact on international trade.105 
The subsequent application of the CISG has, however, shown that good faith plays ‘a bigger role 
than being merely a tool of interpretation.’106 The realization that good faith could potentially 
have a larger role than it had been anticipated was expressed in the Secretariat Commentary, in 
reference to instances where a good faith obligation might be implied in the CISG, when it was 
said that: 
‘The principle of good faith is, however, broader than these examples and applies to all 
aspects of the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention.’107 
It is argued that another justification for the limited scope of good faith in article 7 (1), 
besides underestimating the role that good faith can potentially have in the performance of the 
contract, could be that the drafters did not want to have ‘a stringent good faith provision’ 
imposed on the parties that could possibly hinder the uniformity purpose of the CISG.108 
However, some scholars argue that since the interpretation of the CISG may lead to the 
application of the good faith clause it was not the CISG, which was interpreted, but the 
contract.109 In such a connection, Professor Eörsi submitted that the interpretation of the two 
could not be separated since the CISG ‘constitutes the law of the parties insofar as they do not 
make use of article 6 on freedom of contract.’110 Furthermore, review of decisions and awards 
have demonstrated the difficulty of separating the interpretation of the CISG from interpreting 
the contract and applying good faith to the conduct of the contracting parties.111  
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Although this argument may suggest that article 7 (1) impliedly imposes a duty of good 
faith on the parties, it is still not certain that it does. It can therefore be argued that uniformity in 
the meaning and application of good faith can only be achieved if international trade instruments 
contain separate provisions for the interpretation of the international trade instruments and for 
the imposition of an obligation of good faith on the contractual relationship of the parties. This 
will arguably provide clarity in the application of the concept by such instruments in providing 
that the concept applies not only to the interpretation of such an instrument, or the contract 
between the parties, but also to all aspects of an international commercial transaction regulated 
by such instrument.  
In the case of an implied good faith obligation between contracting parties, Eörsi 
demonstrated the application of the good faith concept in relation to the CISG rule that provides 
that acceptance is effective when received at the other party’s place of business,112 by noting 
that: 
‘[u]nder article 24, a declaration ‘reaches’ the addressee when ‘it is…delivered…to his place 
of business or mailing address…’ If a party knows that the other party who has a place of 
business is away from his home for a considerable period of time, and he nevertheless sends 
that declaration to the mailing address, he may violate the requirement of good faith.’113 
It can be argued from the above that the wording of article 7 (1) has the potential of 
contributing to the lack of clarity on the part that the concept should have in international 
commercial transactions. Therefore a starting point in seeking a uniform interpretation and 
application of good faith in international trade instruments would perhaps demand a widening of 
the scope of good faith application in all international instruments.  
(b) Article 7 (2) 
As discussed, the CISG was drafted to act as a uniform sales law but it does not provide 
solutions to all the problems that may arise from international commercial transactions.114 Article 
4 provides that the issues governed by the CISG are limited to the formation of the contract and 
to the rights and obligations of the parties from such a contract. This article continues to 
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expressly exclude from the CISG’s scope issues associated with the validity of the contract and 
the effect the contract may have on the property in the goods sold.115 Other express exclusions 
can be found in articles 2, 3(2) and 5 of the CISG. Additionally, other situations such as the 
capacity of the parties, the authority on a third person to conclude the contract on another 
person’s behalf, and limitations of action or prescription issues are not mentioned and are 
therefore outside the scope of the CISG.116 Such limitations on the scope of the CISG present 
problems which may require gap-fillings similar to those that exist in any type of incomplete 
body of laws.117 Therefore article 7 (2) of the CISG was drafted to fill any gaps that may arise in 
the CISG, by stating that: 
‘Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled 
in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the 
absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of 
private international law.’ 
It is argued that the purpose of article 7 (2) and gap-filling is directly linked to article 7 (1) 
and interpretation because they are aimed at uniformity in the application of the CISG.118  
It is important to understand the matters to which the rule set forth in article 7 (2) applies in 
order to understand its unification function.119 It is argued that the gaps referred to in article 7 (2) 
are not the matters excluded from the scope of application of the CISG, such as the excluded 
issues observed in article 4 and other articles mentioned above, but to ‘issues to which the CISG 
applies but which it does not expressly resolve’ such as the good faith concept.120  
Furthermore, it can also be argued that good faith is one of the ‘general principles’ referred 
to in article 7 (2) of the CISG. Such principles on which good faith is based are found throughout 
the CISG. Examples of such manifestations are: article 16 (2) (b), which makes an offer 
irrevocable if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely upon the offer being held open and the 
offeree has acted in reliance on the offer;121 article 21 (2), which deals with late acceptance that 
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was sent in such circumstances that, had its transmission been normal, it would have reached the 
offeror in due time,122 and articles 85 to 88, which impose on the parties obligations to preserve 
the goods.123 An implied reference to the good faith concept in the CISG is not limited to these 
examples.124 
Furthermore, the aim of article 7 (1) is closely linked to article 7 (2) because the concept of 
good faith, expressed in article 7 (1), is often used for gap filling in most domestic legal systems. 
This particular function of good faith in continental Europe will be discussed in the next chapter 
of this dissertation. 
Given that the main purpose of the adoption of the CISG was to promote uniformity in the 
application of provisions on the international sale of goods.125 It is an important instrument in 
determining whether uniformity in the meaning and application of the good faith concept is 
attainable. It can be concluded that the wording of article 7 falls short of imposing certainty on 
the role of good faith in the CISG particularly with regard to the contractual relationship between 
the parties. This problem amongst others presents difficulty in the application of good faith as 
seen in court decisions that have applied the CISG.126 
(c) The application of article 7(1) of the CISG       
In practice, the lack of definition of good faith and the limited or perhaps unclear application it 
has been granted by article 7 (1) has led to the States that have ratified the CISG to look upon 
national legislation to give meaning and application to the concept however it is argued that 
decisions and awards from cases dealing with article 7 (1) rarely examine the concept in a 
meaningful way.127 This argument will be examined by looking at three unreported cases.  
In the first instance, there is often uncertainty regarding the type of acts that are to be 
regarded as constituting good faith. This can be seen in the 1993 case of Eximin v Textile and 
Footwear, 128a case that involved parties from Israel and Belgium and concerned a breach of a 
registered trademark from the sale of denim boots. The court held that since both parties knew of 
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the possibility that there might be an already existing registered trademark, and neither 
investigated the matter, both parties acted with a lack of good faith. Therefore, liability for the 
damage should be allocated between the parties. Although the CISG was not directly applied, 
this case is argued to be perhaps the clearest exposition of bad faith as ‘a negative or foil’ for a 
determination of good faith.129 
Although article 7 (1) does not provide for a duty of good faith to be observed between the 
contracting parties the courts have however held that such a duty exists nevertheless. This 
position was confirmed in the Hungarian case,130 in which a Hungarian supplier of mushrooms 
was given an outdated guarantee by an Austrian buyer. The court held this act to be a breach of 
the duty of good faith. The court specifically stated that in its view, good faith is ‘not only an 
interpretive tool to be applied to the CISG itself, but a standard of behavior to be observed by the 
parties too.’131 
Another case in which the CISG was applied to determine the conduct of the parties in the 
commercial transaction was in a German case132 in which a seller sold a used car to a buyer, both 
parties being car dealers. The documents showed that the vehicle was first licensed in 1992 and 
the odometer was low. The sales contract excluded any warranty. The buyer subsequently sold 
the vehicle to a customer who discovered that the vehicle had been first licensed in 1990 and that 
the mileage of the odometer was higher. The buyer paid damages to his customer and demanded 
the same amount as damages from the seller. The court applied the CISG stating that ‘for a party 
to avail itself of its provisions, it must come to the court having acted in good faith.’ In this 
instance it was found that the seller could not rely on the exclusion of warranty because its 
actions with respect to the vehicle were not in good faith. Therefore good faith in this instance is 
‘substantive, limiting the rights of the party to invoke other legal rights.’133 
The case law on article 7 (1) the CISG demonstrates that courts and tribunals have 
frequently used their own domestic legislation or legal reasoning by gap filling to give clarity to 
the CISG obligation of good faith. Although this practice is helpful, it can be argued that it 
                                                 
129  Benedict Sheehy ‘Good Faith in the CISG: The interpretation problems of article 7’ available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1815&context=expresso, accessed on 20 August 2015. 
130 Hungary, Arbitration Court of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Budapest (Docket Number Vb 94124 
of 17 November 1995), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/951117h1.html, accessed on 24 August 2015. 
131 Sheehy op cit note 129 at 28. 
132 Germany, OLG Köhn (Case Number 22 U 4/96 of 21 May 1996), available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960521g1.html, accessed on 24 August 2015. 
133 Sheehy op cit note 129 at 29. 
21 
 
defeats one of the reasons the CISG had been drafted, which was to avoid the homeward trend in 
interpretation.134 
II UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
The UNIDROIT Principles are said to be a ‘construct of international trade laws that are 
common to most legal systems.’135 The criterion used was not the determination of the rules that 
was:  
‘…adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, but rather which of the rules under consideration 
had the most persuasive value or appeared to be well-suited for cross border transactions or 
both.’136 
Furthermore it is said that the objective of the drafters was to make the UNIDROIT Principles 
‘receptive to the actual needs and expectations of international trade practice.’137 The Principles 
therefore contain provisions that are intended to provide fair conditions to international 
commercial transactions. 
The parties to an international commercial contract can chose the UNIDROIT Principles to 
govern their contract.138 When the UNIDROIT Principles apply as the law governing a contract, 
such a contract must be: 
 ‘construed based on the concepts and provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles in light of the 
special conditions of international trade, even though sometimes principles of national law 
may be taken into consideration provided that they are shown to be generally accepted 
amongst the various legal systems.’139 
Good faith is one of such concepts that form part of the UNIDROIT Principles in terms of 
which such contracts must be concluded. However the UNIDROIT Principles do not define good 
faith, although it is mentioned along other concepts such as ‘fair dealing’ and ‘reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing’ who are collective said to embody the concept of good 
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faith.140 The good faith concept is included in different parts of the UNIDROIT Principles either 
expressly or impliedly. 
(a) Article 1.7 
The concept of good faith and fair dealing in the UNIDROIT Principles141 is set out in article 1.7 
which provides that: 
‘(a) Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in international trade. 
(b) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty.’ 
This provision is distinctively different from article 7 (1) of the CISG because it expressly 
imposes a duty of good faith on the parties and ‘conveys the expectation that both parties will act 
in accordance with good faith and fair dealing.’142 Furthermore, good faith is perceived as a 
fundamental principle, and, where the UNIDROIT Principles are applicable to a contract, the 
parties cannot contract out of this principle, even though party autonomy is recognized.143 These 
two provisions provide clarity on the application of good faith in the contractual relationship of 
the parties, therefore having such a provision in all international trade instruments can give 
direction on the function of good faith between the parties. 
Despite this requirement of observance of good faith, the comments on article 1.7 do not 
elaborate on the other functions of good faith and the extent to which such functions are covered 
by the UNIDROIT Principles.144 This omission creates uncertainty regarding the function of 
good faith in the UNIDROIT Principles, similar to the difficulty in article 7 of the CISG. 
However, the functions of good faith in the UNIDROIT Principles can be deduced from the 
following arguments. Firstly, Hartkamp notes that the illustrations in the comments to article 1.7 
refer to provisions in the UNIDROIT Principles which, either directly or indirectly, refer to the 
functions of good faith and fair dealing, for instance article 4.1 refers to the interpretive function 
of the good faith concept, 145 by providing that: 
‘…standard terms should be interpreted primarily in accordance with the reasonable 
expectation of their average users irrespective of the actual understanding which either of the 
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parties to the contract concerned, or reasonable persons of the same kind as the parties, might 
have had.’ 
Furthermore, the concept of good faith has a supplementing function in article 5.2 which states 
that implied obligations may stem from good faith and fair dealing as well as from 
reasonableness.146 Lastly, Hartkamp notes that the restrictive function of good faith is noticeable 
in article 7.4.13 (2) regarding the payment of a specified sum stipulated for the case of non-
performance providing that:  
‘…notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary the specified sum may be reduced to a 
reasonable amount where it is grossly excessive in relation to harm resulting from the non-
performance and to the other circumstances.’ 
Other restrictive functions of good faith can be found in article 6.2.3, which provides that 
in case of hardship, the court may terminate or adapt the contract, and article 7.1.6, which 
provides that unreasonable exemption clauses may not be invoked.147 Hartkamp therefore argues 
that it is less likely that the drafters of the UNIDROIT Principles intended to limit the restrictive 
function of good faith to the examples specified therein.148 In addition, he argues that the concept 
of good faith should be available in other circumstances, for example, to:  
‘…bar a claim based nonperformance, where the aggrieved party, by its previous conduct, 
induced the other party to believe that the aggrieved party would not rely on nonperformance 
as a cause of action.’149  
The difficulty expressed by Hartkamp is similar to that of the Secretariat Commentary, on 
the application of good faith in the CISG, in that the concept of good faith has a larger role to 
play than its scope in article 1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles and article 7 (1) of the CISG. It 
can therefore be argued that attempts to obtain uniformity in the application of good faith must 
be focused on expressly extending the scope of good faith to all contractual aspects of a 
particular international trade instrument, the contractual parties and other relevant aspects of the 
contract without limitations and contractual conditions. 
Another point of contention that may arise that is similar to the CISG and other most 
international instruments, is that the concept of ‘good faith’ is not defined in the UNIDROIT 
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Principles.150 This difficulty is often dealt with by reference to what constitutes bad faith, in 
other words, to what acts are generally inconsistent with the instrument or contractual terms of 
the parties.151 This method of finding a meaning for good faith may not be readily ascertainable 
for instance in cases where it is difficult to establish a determination of bad faith. Inconsistent 
behavior can be said to be one aspect of lack of good faith; for instance, article 1.8 specifically 
prohibits a party from behaving inconsistently ‘with an understanding it has caused the other 
party to have and upon which that other party reasonably has acted in reliance to its 
detriment.’152 Equally, the inclusion of unexpected or surprising terms in contracts shows lack of 
good faith and fair dealing.153 Article 2.1.20 deals with this by providing that, if standards terms 
contain a term that the party would ‘not reasonably have expected, that term will be ineffective, 
unless it has been expressly accepted by that party.’154  
Furthermore, although good faith is not defined, Bonell argues that: 
‘since it is coupled with ‘fair dealing’, it is to be understood in an objective sense, as 
synonymous with what is elsewhere in the UNIDROIT Principles referred to as ‘reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing’, and not in the subjective sense, as a state of mind or 
just ‘acting honestly.’155  
Although such an argument may be logical in the context of the UNIDROIT Principles, 
difficulty may arise in other international instruments where good faith is not coupled with fair 
dealing. It follows from this that an offered aimed at finding uniformity in the application of 
good faith in international instruments surely must be preceded by the determination of a unified 
agreed definition of the concept in international commercial transactions. This is a daunting task, 
as discussed in the previous chapter of this dissertation, because of the elusive nature of the 
concept but it cannot be avoided if a uniform application is to be achieved. 
Furthermore, Bonell argues that the reference ‘to good faith and fair dealing in 
international trade’ makes it clear that in the context of the UNIDROIT Principles, the two 
concepts are not to be applied according to standards originally adopted within the different 
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national legal systems. 156  In addition, Magnus notes that both the CISG and UNIDROIT 
Principles expressly stress the idea that: 
 ‘…no specific national law’s concept of good faith may be applied except one that is 
suitable for international commercial transactions.’157 
 In other words, such domestic standards may be taken into consideration: 
 ‘…only to the extent that they are shown to be generally accepted amongst the various legal 
systems.’158  
This will prevent courts and tribunals from habitually consulting national laws to give good 
faith a meaning by gap filling and will also promote the international appeal of the UNIDROIT 
Principles. 
Both the CISG and UNIDROIT Principles acknowledge that good faith plays an important 
part in international commercial transactions although each instrument differs regarding the role 
of the concept. It can also be noted that both texts do not rely exclusively on one abstract and 
general rule of good faith but try to specify the concept by more specific rules which elaborate it 
in some detail. This is perhaps a useful mechanism in trying to find application for this elusive 
concept within international instruments. In a number of situations the UNIDROIT Principles 
have proven to be of helpful assistance for the good faith application in the CISG, therefore 
combining the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles one gets a good impression of what good 
faith in international commercial transactions should and could mean if uniformity of the concept 
in international trade instruments is to be achieved. 159 
(b) Article 2.15    
This provision is an example of an express good faith obligation which is applicable in certain 
circumstances however it takes a different approach by referring to the converse of good faith, 
which is bad faith.160 The bad faith addressed is limited to negotiations.161 Article 2.15 provides 
that: 
‘(1) A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an agreement. 
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(2) However, a party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations in bad faith is liable for losses 
caused to the other party. 
(3) It is bad faith, in particular, for a party to enter into or continue negotiations intending not 
to reach an agreement with the other party.’ 
In contrast to article 1.7, the provisions of article 2.15 are relatively specific and thereby 
assist in giving notice to contractors of what standards of contract are excluded from the concept 
of good faith. 
(c) The application of article 1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles 
The good faith provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles, in particular article 1.7, have frequently 
been applied by courts and arbitral tribunals in their rulings and arbitral decisions although it is 
not used as a binding legal rule of a contract in most cases but ‘merely referred to or invoked by 
the tribunals or the parties as an aide to decision making.’162  
This non legal binding application of good faith was used in an ad hoc arbitration in 
2004,163 where the arbitral tribunal held that parties have a good faith obligation to attempt to 
resolve disputes arising from a contract under articles 1134 (3) and 1135 of the French civil code 
relevant also in international trade and article 1.7 (1) of the UNIDROIT Principles. However, the 
tribunal concluded that: 
 ‘…the mere failure to reach an agreement was not in itself a breach of good faith and that 
the parties are not required to ‘grant large concessions’ in order to comply with the good 
faith obligation.’164 
 Barnes notes that this decision shows the ambiguous nature of good faith because: 
 ‘…on the one hand parties have an obligation to attempt to settle a dispute, but on the other 
hand, they do not have to grant large concessions to reach an agreement.’165  
In addition, the range of possible circumstances between those extremes is the ‘seemingly 
unknowable realm of good faith.’166 
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Despite the problems with the application of article 1.7 as a consequence of the ambiguous 
nature of good faith, the courts and arbitral tribunals have nevertheless expressed the importance 
of applying the concept as provided in article 1.7.167 This was found in 1997 by the Federal 
Court of Australia in Federal Hughes Aircraft Systems International case.168  
‘The dispute in this case concerned a bidding procedure, which had arisen between a 
Californian company and an Australian governmental agency after the latter awarded the 
contract to another bidder. According to the claimant, the defendant had failed to conduct the 
tender evaluation fairly and in a manner that would have ensured equal opportunity to both 
bidders. In this case, the Federal Court of Australia had to decide whether there was an 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in accordance with article 1.7 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles, which was used as a reference to supplement the domestic law. Finn J concluded 
that there was implied duty of good faith and fair dealing and that a general duty of good 
faith and fair dealing was not only recognised in a number of foreign jurisdictions but had 
also been propounded as a fundamental principle to be honoured in international commercial 
contracts.’169  
Finn J continued to express the role of an implied duty of good faith by stating that: 
‘… I consider a virtue of the implied duty to be that it expresses in a generalization of 
universal application, the standard of conduct to which all contracting parties are to be 
expected to adhere throughout the lives of their contracts. It may well be that, on analysis, 
that standard would be found to advance little the standard that presently may be exacted 
from contracting parties by other means…. But setting the appropriate standard of fair 
dealing is, in my view, another matter altogether from acceptance of the duty itself.’   
Furthermore, it can be argued that it is sensible for the good faith provisions in the 
UNIDROIT Principles to be applied in international commercial transactions since they are in 
line with the provisions of many jurisdictions that deal with the concept.170 
Such an instance in which the application of good faith was found to be consistent with the 
national legislation of the contracting parties was in 2002 in an award of the Arbitration Court of 
the Lausanne Chamber of Commerce and Industry.171 In this case, a Turkish company and a 
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company incorporated in West Indies entered into an agreement concerning highly sophisticated 
equipment.172 The contract contained two conflicting choice of law clauses, one was in favour of 
English law and the other in favour of Swiss law. In view of the uncertainties as to the applicable 
substantive law, the arbitral tribunal suggested the Parties choose the UNIDROIT Principles as 
the applicable law. The contracting parties agreed to do so, also in view of the fact that the 
application of the UNIDROIT Principles was not seen as precluding the application of the 
English law if applicable as maintained by one party and the Swiss law if applicable as proposed 
by the other party. 173  The arbitral tribunal found that one of the parties had not properly 
performed its obligation arising from the contract, amongst other provisions the arbitral tribunal 
referred to article 1.7 on good faith and article 2.16 on the duty of confidentiality.  
It can be concluded from the arguments of commentators, courts and arbitral decisions that 
good faith and fair dealing is one of the fundamental concepts of the UNIDROIT Principles. 
Despite having this prominent position, it is up to the courts or arbitral tribunals to make 
determinations to reach rational solutions in interpreting the provisions in the UNIDROIT 
Principles under the ambiguous nature of good faith.174 The nature of such good faith provisions 
is said to merely provide ‘umbrella principles to give space to judges to give space for judges to 
apply justice fairness, and not to forget, objective standard.’175 
III Principles of European Contract Law 
The process of establishing the PECL by the Commission on European Contract Law began in 
1982; Part I of the PECL dealing with performance, non-performance and remedies was 
published in 1995, Parts I and II was published in 1999.176 The Third Commission started to 
prepare rules on compound interest, conditions and the effect of illegality, and rules on subjects 
which are common to contracts, torts and unjust enrichment.177 
According to the Commission on European contract law the main purpose of the PECL is: 
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‘…to serve as the first draft of a part of a European Civil Code and since common law does 
not exist in the European Union, the PECL has been established by a more radical 
process.’178  
No legal system has formed the basis of the PECL, the Commission has paid attention to 
‘all the systems of the Member States’ however not each of them has had influence on every 
issue dealt with and the ‘rules of the legal systems outside of the Communities’ have also been 
considered as well as international trade instruments such as the CISG.179 It is also said that some 
of the PECL reflect ‘ideas which have not yet materialized in the law of any state.’180 
The PECL and its good faith provisions are a product of a committee without law-making 
authority thus they are made to serve as statements of ‘derivative general legal norms’ rather 
than as ‘descriptions of any existing body of law.’181 Therefore the PECL is said to lack formal 
legal authority, although the drafters expected such an authority to arise through the adoption or 
use of the PECL by legislators, judges, arbitrators, and contracting parties.182 
The PECL are not necessarily international trade instruments like the CISG and the 
UNIDROIT Principles but their good faith provisions are relevant to the dissertation since the 
PECL encompass contractual principles from numerous jurisdictions. Hence two good faith 
provisions of the PECL, articles 1:106 (1) and 1:201 will be discussed. 
(a) Article 1:106 (1)  
This provision sets out the general criteria for interpretation and supplementation of the PECL. It 
states that: 
‘(1) These Principles should be interpreted and developed in accordance with their purposes. 
In particular, regard should be had to the need to promote good faith and fair dealing, 
certainly in contractual relationships and uniformity of application.’ 
The purpose of such a provision is said to: 
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 ‘…avoid the risk of parochial interpretation of an international uniform law text both from 
the point of view of the techniques used and of the possible influence of domestic law legal 
concepts.’183 
It is derived from article 7 of the CISG which is often considered as ‘the paradigm of the 
concept of good faith’ in international trade instruments. Article 1:106 does not, however, refer 
to the ‘international character’ of the PECL as an element to be taken into account in interpreting 
it.184 The reason for this could be that although the PECL is said to constitute a ‘supranatural’ 
body of laws as far as their origin are concerned, they define themselves as ‘general rules of 
contracts’ for European countries and do not restrict their application to international 
transactions.185 
Furthermore, although the PECL follows the example of article 7 of the CISG, where the 
observance of good faith in international trade is expressly mentioned as a standard of 
interpretation of the CISG it differs from the CISG because the PECL contains other provisions 
mentioning good faith and fair dealing in negotiations, performance and interpretation of the 
contract.186 
Following the example of article 7 of the CISG, article 1:106 (1) underlines the importance 
of a uniform application of the PECL. The practical experience of other international trade 
instruments such as the CISG has, however, demonstrated the difficulties experienced when 
trying to achieve a truly uniform application of a uniform law text.187 Furthermore Antoniolli 
notes that: 
‘…since the PECL are not yet a community law instrument, one cannot rely on the binding 
guidelines from a supranatural judicial body such as the European Court of Justice.’188  
Therefore, among the different means that can help reduce the danger of a non-uniform 
application, it is submitted that the most effective way to comply with article 1:106 is first of all 
‘to consider how they have been applied by judges and arbitrators in the member States.’189 
                                                 









(b) Article 1:201 
This provision is similar to article 1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles as it imposes a duty of good 
faith on the conduct of the contracting parties. It states that:  
‘(1) Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing. 
(2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty.’ 
The wording of article 1:201 (1) imposes a duty of good faith on each party to the contract 
and defines it in such wide terms that it establishes a ‘general obligation’, furthermore it can be 
drawn from the wording used in the text that good faith is required both: 
‘…during the implementation of the contract and at the stage of its formation.’190  
The initial text imposed on each party the duty to act in good faith: 
‘…while exercising their rights and performance of their duties’.191  
However, in their second version the PECL have opted for a ‘wider definition than the one 
first.’192 Mazeaud argues that this may have been done to extend the degree of good faith to be 
observed by the parties in their contract.193 
Moreover, according to Busch, good faith in article 1:201 should be ‘considered as a 
subjective concept, whereas fair dealing has a more objective character.’194  Furthermore, he 
notes that the concepts of good faith and fair dealing as laid down in article 1:201 should be 
distinguished from the ‘good faith’ of a purchaser who acquires goods or documents of title 
without notice of third-party claims to the goods or documents, to which this provision does not 
extend.195 The provisions of article 1: 201 are also seen as supplementing the PECL and may 
even take precedence over other provisions of the PECL, should a strict adherence to those lead 
to ‘a manifestly unjust result.’196 
Furthermore, although article 1:201(2) prohibits the parties from excluding, or limiting, the 
duty to observe the concepts of good faith and fair dealing, it is argued the parties may to some 
extent influence the meaning of good faith, depending on what they have agreed upon in the 
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contract.197 An example of such an instance is that the parties can agree that even a ‘technical 
breach’ may entitle the aggrieved party to refuse performance in a situation where its agents ‘can 
ascertain that a technical breach has occurred but not whether or not it is a minor breach.’198 
However the Comment to article 1:201 adds that: 
‘a party should never have the right to take advantage of a term in the contract or of one of 
the PECL in such a way that, given the circumstances, would be unacceptable according to 
the standards of good faith and fair dealing.’199 
Aside from the above mentioned provisions there are a number of specific rules expressly 
stated in the PECL which are seen as expressions of good faith and fair dealing.200 Examples of 
such rules include: the duty not to negotiate a contract with no real intention of reaching an 
agreement with the other party in article 2:301; the duty not to disclose confidential information 
given by the other party in the course of negotiations in article 2:302; the duty not take unfair 
advantage of the other party’s dependence, economic distress or other weakness in article 4:109; 
the right given to a debtor to cure a defective performance before the time for performance in 
article 8:104, and the right to refuse to make specific performance of a contractual obligation if 
this would cause the debtor unreasonable effort and expense in article 9:102.201 
Furthermore, Storme argues that: 
‘…the real function of good faith in the PECL can only be understood when one sees the 
interplay between express good faith provisions and the above rules, he notes that such an 
interplay does not only relate to performance and non-performance of contracts, but also to 
formation of contracts.’202 
For the time being, there is said to be limited case law on the PECL.203 In order to facilitate 
the application of the good faith concept in the PECL, Antoniolli suggests that it would be useful 
to follow the examples of existing initiatives regarding CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles.204 
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CHAPTER 4 GOOD FAITH IN NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF LAW 
The concept of good faith remains controversial in national legal systems particularly because it 
is a ‘manifestly different concept in common law and civil law jurisdictions.’205 The common 
law countries ‘generally remain reluctant towards good faith’.206 An example of such a position 
is English lawyers who: 
‘…appear to be the most resolutely opposed to it, judging that whatever useful rule the 
concept might play is better performed by more specific doctrines.’207  
On the other hand, good faith is ‘a key concept in civil law systems.’208 The different 
position in the recognition of good faith in civil and common law jurisdictions was expressed by 
Mackaay when stating that: 
‘For some, good faith must be articulated as a general rule or an abstract principle; for others, 
good faith is better pursued, without necessarily using the term, through a myriad of 
particular institutions designed to ensure its presence in specific cases; the concept itself 
would merely serve as a moral standard. Civil law systems tend towards the former position, 
common law towards the latter.’209 
Despite such contrast in the recognition of good faith in national legal systems, it is still 
contained in most European Civil Codes. Some of these Codes have particular provisions that 
include a reference to the concept, while others have provisions which indirectly stipulate that 
good faith is to be observed.210 It is therefore argued that many rules in the Codes encompass the 
application of the concept good faith.211 
The distinction between objective and subjective good faith is made by most European 
legal systems. Subjective good faith is said to include:  
‘…a subjective state of mind, whilst objective good faith is usually regarded as a norm for 
the conduct of contracting parties.’212 
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This distinction is intensified in some systems by introducing separate words for objective 
good faith, for example Treu und Glauben in the German Civil Code (BGB). Other legal 
systems, such as France, have not made such a distinction.213 
Hesselink argues that: 
‘…in practice, the inclusion of good faith in independent European legal systems has had 
success during the 20th century as the number of cases where the good faith clause has been 
applied increased over the last few decades.’214 
Furthermore it is said that good faith:  
‘…plays a role of interpretation in most European legal systems therefore many contain a 
statutory provision on good faith interpretation, while in other legal systems the interpretive 
role of the good faith concept has been established by the courts.’215 
This dissertation argues that the time has come for international trade instruments to 
examine the concept of good faith by directing their focus beyond the provisions in such 
instruments and looking at how the concept is applied in the leading national legal systems that 
have adopted different approaches to give meaning and application to the concept, with the 
objective of adopting the approaches that are deemed practical for international trade instruments 
in order to reach a uniform meaning and application of good faith. It remains clear, however, that 
the courts cannot construe an international contract by reference to pre-existing good faith 
notions derived from national laws.216 This chapter of the dissertation will therefore examine the 
meaning and application of good faith in continental Europe. This will be done by a study of 
different legal systems, namely Germany, Netherlands, the United States and England. 
(a) German Legal System 
(i) The application of good faith in the German Civil Code   
The concept of good faith occupies different roles in the German Civil Code. Firstly, the Code is 
used in interpretation. Kornet, in his analysis notes that in terms of German law a contract is 
regarded as:  
‘…a two-sided legal act because it is formed by two corresponding declarations of intention 
(Willenserklärungen).’  
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They are generally referred to as the offer and its corresponding acceptance.217 The content of the 
concluded contract is determined by interpreting these declarations of intention.218 The process 
of interpretation in the German Civil Code is guided by sections 133 and 157. Section 157 is 
most relevant to good faith interpretation, providing that:  
‘Contracts are to be interpreted as required by good faith, taking customary practice into 
consideration.’ 
Furthermore, the most relevant function of good faith to this dissertation is the application 
of the concept to the conduct of the contracting parties; this will be discussed with relation to the 
meaning of good faith in the German Civil Code. 
(ii) Treu und Glauben     
Although the concept of good faith has been recognized in Germany for over a number of years 
an actual definition of the concept has not been established.219 The term Treu und Glauben is 
used in the German Civil Code and literally means ‘fidelity and faith’. It generally refers to the 
concept of good faith.220 Furthermore, according to Whittaker and Zimmermann, Treu refers to 
concepts such as ‘faithfulness, loyalty, reliability, and an unselfish willingness to comply with 
the one’s given word and the obligations assumed’, in other words, loyalty to the contract and 
Gluabe means ‘belief in the sense of faith or reliance’.221 It is said that the combination of ‘Treu 
und Glauben’ is sometimes seen to transcend the sum of its component and to be widely 
understood as: 
 ‘…a conceptual entity that demonstrates the existence of a relationship of trust between the 
two parties, and requires consideration of each party’s reasonable reliance.’222 
In addition, Kornet notes that Treu und Glauben requires: 
‘…each contracting party to have such regard to the interest of the other party when 
exercising its rights, as can be reasonably expected.’223  
In other words, a contract is not only to be performed in accordance with the letter of the 
contract, but also in accordance with:  
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‘…its aim and purpose, and in light of what the other party, in view of the circumstances, 
and what has been discussed by the parties could expect, and in accordance with the usage of 
reasonable business dealings.’224 
Perhaps the most comprehensive explanation of Treu und Glauben function was presented 
by Kornet when she said that:225 
‘Treu und Glauben is to be regarded as a legal ethical principle, that allows extralegal, social 
norms and moral-ethical principles to be incorporated in the law that are not otherwise 
capable of being incorporated in the law, but which are seen to provide the foundation for the 
legal order.’226 
Therefore, if a contract is to be interpreted in terms of Treu und Glauben, consideration has 
to be given to the ‘prevailing economic and social order and immanent legal ethics.’227 Although 
this may be practical in terms of domestic contract law, it can be argued that if a uniform 
meaning of good faith was to be adopted in all international trade instrument the suggestion of 
Kornet could make achieving such an objective impossible because of the contrasting economic 
and social orders that may prevail in the countries of the parties to an international commercial 
transaction. The concept of good faith (Treu und Glauben) is expressed in sections 157 and 242 
of the German Civil Code, for the purposes of the dissertation the focus will be on section 242. 
(iii) Section 242 
The interpretation of a contract under German law in terms of Treu und Glauben is enshrined in 
section 242 of the German Civil Code, which provides that: 
‘The debtor is bound to effect performance according to the requirements of good faith (Treu 
und Glauben), giving consideration to common practice (Verskehrssitte).’ 
According to Kornet, section 242 is to be considered as a ‘general clause’ in the sense that 
it formulates a general legal principle, which ‘directs the court to determine whether the manner 
and the nature of performance of the contractual obligations are in accordance with good 
faith.’228 Treu und Glauben is an open-ended norm without substantative content it is therefore 
argued not to be capable of direct application to a particular set of facts.229 This observation is 
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similar to that of scholars who regard the good faith concept as being elusive.230 Since neither the 
conditions of application, nor the legal consequences of application of good faith are provided 
for in section 242, the task of creating a suitable solution is left to the judges.231  Arguably if a 
similar omission on the application of good faith was to exist in a provision of an international 
trade instrument, it would defeat the purpose of uniformity of the good faith concept. 
It can be gathered from the wording of section 242 that common practices (Verskehrssitte) 
have a significant role to play in determining the requirements of good faith. It is said that 
Verskehrssitte refer to: 
‘…the common practices or objective values within a particular society or groups within a 
society’232 
 Therefore to establish the existence of a common practice demands an establishment of 
‘an actual practice’, based on the assumption that in a large number of cases parties act in the 
same manner.233 In other words, a mere conviction that an actual practice exists is not enough, 
there must be evidence of an actual practice.234 
Furthermore it is argued that common practices are not legal norms and can thus not be 
regarded as equivalent to good faith (Treu und Glauben).235 Instead it is to be regarded as a 
‘Hilfsinstrument bei der normativen Wertung’ of good faith, meaning that common practice must 
be regarded as an aid instruments to judging or evaluation whether the requirements of good 
faith had been fulfilled by the debtor. 236  The good faith concept and common practice are 
connected through the formulation of ‘mit Rücksicht auf’ which indicates:  
‘On the one hand that common practice is subsidiary to good faith and must therefore be 
substantively compatible with it…On the other hand, it indicates that common practice does 
contribute to the further specification (Präzisierung) of good faith.’ 
 Therefore good faith will prevail if a common practice contradicts the requirements of 
good faith.237 Additionally it argued that common practice should be ‘regarded as a relevant 
factor for the concretization of good faith.’238  
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Given the fact that good faith (Treu und Glauben) is an ‘open-ended norm lacking 
substantive content’, German scholars have identified functions in order to give it structure and 
content.239 There is, however, no uniform theory, but it is possible to differentiate between four 
functions of good faith.240 Kornet argues that the first function of good faith is that the concept is 
used to regulate or concretize the manner of performance.241 To illustrate this function she notes 
that: 
‘For example, section 242 is used to further concretize the specific provisions on the 
performance of the contract, such as section 271 concerning the place of performance.’242  
Secondly, according to Zimmermann and Whittaker it is generally recognized that section 
242 operates supplendi causa and specifies the way in which contractual performance has to be 
rendered thereby giving rise to ‘a host of ancillary or supplementary duties’ that may arise under 
the contract.243 It is argued that such duties include amongst others the ‘duties of information, 
documentation, co-operation, protection and disclosure.’244 Furthermore it is argued that these 
duties of section 242 can also apply:  
‘…in the pre-contractual situation (culpa in contrahendo) and they may extend after the 
contract has been performed (culpa post contractum finitum).’245    
Thirdly, section 242 serves to ‘limit the exercise of contractual rights.’246 Finally, and 
perhaps the most ‘problematic function’ is that section 242 has been used to ‘interfere in 
contractual relations in order to avoid grave injustice.’247 
It is argued from the nature of these functions that section 242 has grown beyond its literal 
meaning.248 This is similar to the CISG where the application of the good faith concept in article 
7 had gone beyond its intended purpose of merely being a tool of interpretation.249 However, 
section 242 of the German Civil Code is said to provide the courts: 
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‘…with a large amount of judicial freedom and necessary discretion to specify, supplement 
and modify the law, i.e. develop the law in accordance with the perceived needs of their 
time’250 
This broad nature of good faith in the German Civil Code has led some scholars to 
advocate ‘abandonment of most concrete legal provisions in favour of section 242.’ It is argued 
that such scholars have already succeeded: 
‘…one can find a court decision or a scholarly theory applying the provision to almost every 
situation governed by the German Civil Code, and in addition very often overriding the text 
and the meaning of special provisions.’251  
Furthermore, Schlechtriem notes that ‘it seems as if the ironic remark often made with 
respect to Roman Law, as well as to the case law of the Anglo-Saxon countries, holds true to the 
consequences of the principle of Treu und Glauben under German law as well’,252 namely that:  
‘…you can find a source (be it a court decision or a scholarly theory) for every solution 
imaginable or wanted, 242 BGB [Good Faith] serving as the legal anchor to even the wildest 
propositions and results.’253 
Perhaps this standard of broadness in the German Civil Code was the pursued objective 
when drafting article 7 (1) of the CISG however the inclusion of good faith in article 7 (1) as a 
broad requirement was rejected during the drafting of the CISG.254 There was perhaps a shared 
opinion that allowing a broad application of article 7 (1) of the CISG may undermine the 
application of the CISG, some authors have also argued that the continued criticism which 
intends to broaden the effect of good faith in the CISG will eventually lead to the to the 
recognition of a general obligation on the parties to behave accordingly.255 
The process of identifying the functions of good faith in the German Civil Code has had 
criticism largely because of the elusive nature of the concept.256 Therefore Schmidt argues that 
although the identified functions of section 242 represent an analysis of the application of section 
242 they however ‘do not provide a normative description of the content of section 242’ and 
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should therefore be abandoned.257 Similarly the identification of the functions of good faith in 
international trade instruments could yield different outcomes in each instrument and thus disturb 
the attempts of having uniformity in the interpretation and application of the concept in 
international commercial transactions. Some scholars argue that the identification of functions 
can be useful in enabling the predictability of future judgments based on good faith (Treu und 
Glauben) even though the functions are ‘not always capable of clear delineation.’258 
(b) Dutch legal system 
(i) Redelijkheid en Billijkheid  
In the Dutch Civil Code, two sub-terms are used, just as in the German Civil Code, to refer to 
good faith (geode trouw). They are Redelijkheid en Billijkheid that literally mean ‘reasonableness 
and fairness.’259 Kornet argues that the distinction between the two can be determined by their 
individual definitions, that is, ‘reasonableness’ ‘engages the head and refers to reason,’ and 
‘fairness’ ‘engages the heart and refers to emotion.’260 However, they are according to legislator 
to be regarded ‘in combination as interconnected,’ and neither is to be considered in isolation.261 
Therefore ‘good faith,’ in the sense of reasonableness and fairness, is generally referred to as 
‘hendiadys,’ in Dutch case law. 262  According to the Oxford dictionary, the term hendiadys 
means: 
‘The expression of a single idea by two words connected with ‘and’, for example nice and 
warm, when one could be used to modify the other, as in nicely warm.’ 263 
 Furthermore, similar to Treu und Glauben in the German Civil Code, it argued that Redelijkheid 
en Billijkheid is a legal-ethical principle that ‘addresses the subjective state of the parties,’ such a 
state is said to include further vague values such as decency, honesty and loyalty.264 
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(ii) The application of Redelijkheid en Billijkheid 
Hartkamp argues that Redelijkheid en Billijkheid has three functions in the Dutch Civil Code. 
First, it entails that all contracts must be ‘interpreted according to good faith.265 However the 
interpretation of contracts in the Netherlands has recently been dominated by the standard of 
interpretation established by the Dutch Supreme Court’s judgment in Ermes v Haviltex 1981.266 
In that case, the Supreme Court rejected a ‘purely literal approach to interpretation as well as an 
interpretation of the contract exclusively based on the subjective intentions of the parties.’267 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the contract ‘should rather be interpreted in the light of 
the parties’ intentions and expectations in given circumstances.’268 This standard of interpreting 
contracts in general was elaborated by the Supreme Court as follows:269 
‘How a written contract regulates the relationship between the parties and whether that 
contract leaves a gap that must be supplemented, cannot be determined on the basis of a 
purely literal interpretation of the provisions of a contract. To answer that question, it is 
necessary to have regard to the meaning that the respective parties in the given circumstances 
could have reasonably attached to these provisions and to take that which in that respect they 
could reasonably have expected from each other.’270 
It is argued that the concept of good faith is already incorporated in the Haviltex 
standards.271 Some scholars are therefore of the opinion that it is not necessary to call on good 
faith directly in the context of contract interpretation and application in the Netherlands.272   
Secondly, Redelijkheid en Billijkheid has a supplementary function although this has been 
given the least amount of attention by Dutch contract law scholars.273 Three common approaches 
to analyzing the supplementary function of good faith in case law have been identified.274 It is 
noted that the first approach to analyzing the supplementary function of good faith is to: 
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‘…create a catalogue of cases in which the contract has been supplemented with duties 
stemming from good faith.’275  
A second approach involves:  
‘…an analysis of case law on the basis of the types of contracts to which supplementary 
obligations based on good faith is added.’276  
A third approach is to: 
‘…consider the factors that the courts take into account in order to determine the duties that 
are supplemented to the contract.’277  
Finally, the standard of Redelijkheid en Billijkheid has a restrictive effect as the rule to be 
observed by the parties ‘will not be applicable as far as it, given the relevant circumstances, 
would be unacceptable to standards of reasonableness and fairness.’278 It is said that the effect of 
this provision is that ‘a contractual or additional statutory provision must be set aside if its 
applicability has the potential undesirable consequence for one of the contracting parties.’279 
It is argued that where the courts have to apply an elusive, open-ended norm such as 
Redelijkheid en Billijkheid, they must find as many ‘objective factors as possible to justify their 
decision.’280 This is particular the case where the courts’ discretion appears to be the greatest.281 
In such case, it is ‘necessary to let objective norms, principles and legal convictions applicable in 
the courts legal community guide its decisions,’ though the court ‘is not a law unto itself’ in such 
cases.282  
Furthermore, it is said that the Dutch Civil Code lacks a provision such as a ‘general 
character of Swiss Civil Code,’ which provides that the provision of good faith is applicable to 
all ‘Zivilrechtliche Verhältnisse’ this has limited the application of Redelijkheid en Billijkheid 
only to contracts, although the Dutch Civil Code practically works the same way.283 
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(iii) Article 6:2  
The Dutch legislature has incorporated the concept of good faith (Redelijkheid en 
Billijkheid) in articles 6:2 and 6:248 of the Dutch Civil Code where it is expressed ‘in relation to 
the relationship between the creditor and debtor,’ similar to section 242 of the German Civil 
Code;284 article 6:2 (1) provides that both parties to an obligation must behave themselves in 
accordance with the standards of reasonableness and fairness in their dealings with each other.285 
Furthermore article 6:2 (2) states that a rule binding upon such parties by virtue of law, common 
practice or a juridical act does not apply as far as this would be unacceptable, in the 
circumstances, by standards of reasonableness and fairness.286 In addition, article 6:248 repeats 
this provision in the context of contracts stating that the contractual agreement between the 
parties must not only have the legal effects which the parties have agreed upon, but also those 
which, to the nature of the agreement, arise from law, common practice or the standards of 
reasonableness and fairness.287  
(c) The United States legal system 
(i) The Uniform Commercial Code                   
The U.C.C is made up of ‘a number of uniform Acts and federal statutes,’ such as the 
above mentioned, which have been promulgated ‘to harmonize the law of sales and other 
commercial transactions in all 50 states’ and it is said to embody a ‘major corpus of American 
commercial law.’288 Therefore the primary focus of this part of the dissertation will be on the 
meaning and application of the good faith concept in the U.C.C in order to determine if there are 
provisions within the U.C.C that can be adopted by international trade instruments in an attempt 
to reach uniformity. 
(ii) The application of good faith in the U.C.C      
Professor Farnsworth notes that the U.C.C applies good faith in two fundamentally 
different senses; one group of the U.C.C sections involves what may be loosely described as 
‘good faith purchase’, he explains that in these sections good faith is used ‘to describe a state of 
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mind,’ in other words, a party is advantaged only if he acted with ‘innocent ignorance or lack of 
notice’. 289  As an illustration to this point Professor Farnsworth points out two provisions of the 
U.C.C, firstly, in terms of section 3-205 and 3-302 whether the holder of a negotiable instrument 
is a holder in due course depends, under the U.C.C, on whether he purchased in good faith.290 
Furthermore, he notes that the U.C.C. also uses ‘good faith’, as did prior law, in the same sense 
in ‘protecting other parties besides purchasers,’291 for instance, section 7-404 provides that a 
bailee who in good faith has received goods and delivered or otherwise disposed of the goods 
according to the terms of a document of title and the U.C.C will not be liable for the goods, 
‘regardless of whether the person from which the bailee received the goods did not have 
authority to procure the document or to dispose of the goods, or the person to which the bailee 
delivered the goods did have authority to receive the goods.’ Additionally, section 3-417 
provides that a drawee bank that pays a holder on an altered check in good faith may recover the 
payment.292   
In the second and smaller group of the U.C.C provisions, Farnsworth notes that good faith 
is used to:  
‘…describe performance or enforcement rather than purchase in which case good faith has 
nothing to do with the state of mind rather the inquiry involves decency, fairness or 
reasonableness in performance and enforcement.’293  
He argues that this sense of the term may be characterized as ‘good faith performance’ to 
distinguish it from ‘good faith in purchase’.294 
What stands out from the above illustrations by Professor Farnsworth is that good faith 
plays a more intense role in the U.C.C than it does in the German and Dutch legal systems. It can 
perhaps be argued that this method of the concept in purchase and performance adopted by the 
U.C.C can be applied in all international trade instruments in order to ensure uniformity in the 
application of the concept in international commercial transactions however, the emulation of 
this in depth functions of good faith to international trade instruments could be a contentious 
exercise as some countries could prefer the concept to play an overall overriding role rather than 
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being imposed as a stringent obligation in the purchase and performance aspect of international 
commercial transactions, this point was expressed by some commentators in the discussion 
leading up to the inclusion of the good faith in article 7 (1) of the CISG.295  
(iii) Article 1-203 of the U.C.C  
The United States is said to be the only common law country to have included the concept of 
good faith in its statutory regime.296 Article 1-203 of the U.C.C, as adopted in 1960, provides 
that:  
‘Every contract or duty within the Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance 
and enforcement’. 
This provision was reinforced in section 205 of the Second Restatement of Contracts where 
a duty of good faith and fair dealing was also imposed on the parties in its performance and 
enforcement.297 Section 205 provides that:  
‘Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith in its performance and its 
obligation.’ 
Critics of article 1-203 argued that the provision was only applicable to areas covered by 
the U.C.C, which includes contracts of sale, documentary letter of credit and securities. 
Therefore it was not applicable to all contracts as a general rule.298 Moreover, Burton proposes a 
revision of article 1-203 as the provision lumps the words ‘performance’ and ‘enforcement’ 
together as ‘obligations’. He argues for the rephrasing of this provision as: 
‘Good faith in contract performance is an obligation, the breach of which is an ordinary 
breach of contract.’299 
 After this provision, the Code had been adopted by almost all States and governs a greater 
part of commercial transactions in the United States thereby making it ‘a source of reference in 
determining the definition of and what is covered by good faith based on different articles.’300 
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(iv) Meaning of good faith in the U.C.C 
The U.C.C differs from most domestic legal systems and international trade instruments as it 
includes several definitions of the good faith.301 The definitions differ depending on the context 
in which they are used.302  
Firstly, article 1-102 (20) provides that good faith entails: 
‘Honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.’  
This definition is said to apply to the whole of the U.C.C, except Section 5 regarding letters 
of credit that defines good faith in article 5-107(7) as: 
‘Honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.’  
Furthermore, 2-103 (1) (b) of the Index of Definitions, 2002, defines good faith in the case 
of merchants as: 
‘Honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the 
trade.’ 
Fauvarque-Cosson points out that it is noteworthy that,303 in addition to these definitions of 
good faith, article 1:304 provides that:  
‘The obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care prescribed by [the 
Uniform Commercial Code] may not be disclaimed by agreement. The parties, by 
agreement, may determine the standards by which the performance of those obligations is to 
be measured if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable’. 
Some scholars have argued that these definitions are broad.304 Additionally there are few 
guidelines which can serve to give an interpretation to the concept.305 This has led to confusion 
about the meaning of the term ‘in actual practice and how it should be applied.’306 In response to 
such confusion, Eisenberg came with a hypothesis of the meaning of good faith in the context of 
the U.C.C. As a starting point, he argues that the requirement of good faith under the U.C.C is, in 
effect ‘a firm a far-reaching directive to the business community.’307 Secondly, Eisenberg notes 
that the meaning of good faith demands that parties to a commercial transactions conduct their 
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business in a ‘just and moral manner, within the framework of generally accepted prevailing 
business practices and aware of the happenings in the sectors of a particular transaction.’308 
Thirdly, such parties ‘must beware’, just as the buyer and seller in retail transactions.309 Lastly, 
he expressed the importance of the courts applying a good faith obligation in deciding a case 
stating that:  
‘…the day has passed when courts will close their eyes to the facts involved and enforce a 
contract or transaction because it was purportedly entered into between seemingly 
knowledgeable and experienced businessmen who considered themselves to be in an equal 
bargaining situation when they entered into the transaction or agreement.’310  
Furthermore, Burton in his analysis of the definition of good faith in the U.C.C, points out 
that the main issue, in most discussions on the matter, involves the question of subjective and 
objective standards.311 He argues that, in relation to article 1-102 (20), on the one hand, ‘honesty’ 
is ‘supposed to be a subjective standard’ while, on the other hand, ‘reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing’ is an ‘objective standard,’ although it might not be the same as 
‘standards of reasonableness, commercial reasonableness, or due care.’312 Furthermore, he notes 
that, in relation to article 1:201 (20) ‘honesty in fact’ was intended to govern in the ‘good faith 
purchaser’ and ‘holder in due course’ contexts.313 He argues that perhaps the drafters of the 
U.C.C thought contract performance and enforcement were in the contexts ‘requiring a different 
meaning, allowed by the chapeau to section 1-201,’314 which provides that: 
‘(a) Unless the context otherwise requires, words or phrases defined in this section, or in the 
additional definitions contained in other articles of the Uniform Commercial Code that apply 
to particular articles or parts thereof, have the meanings stated.’ 
(d) English legal system 
English courts have historically demonstrated hostility towards the concept of good faith in 
English contract law.315 and the general view of commentators is that there is no legal concept of 
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good faith in English law.316 Perhaps the most cited opinions when opposing the application of 
good faith is in the case of Interfoto,317 where Lord Bingham states that: 
‘In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside the common law 
world, the law of obligations recognizes and enforces an overriding principle that in making 
and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith. This does not simply mean that 
they should not deceive each other, a principle which any legal system must recognise; its 
effect is perhaps most aptly conveyed by such metaphorical colloquialisms as ‘playing fair’, 
‘coming clean’ or ‘putting one’s cards face upwards on the table.’ It is in essence a principle 
of fair open dealing […] English law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such 
overriding principle but has developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated 
problems of unfairness.’318 
This position is contrary to many civil law systems, in which there is often an overriding 
principle that the parties must act in good faith in the negotiation and performance of contractual 
obligations.319 
(i) Watford v Miles 
The different position taken by English courts on the obligation of contractual good faith and 
how it was approached in case law can be seen in Watford v Miles.320 This case concerned the 
validity of lock-in and lock-out agreements, both of which were held to be unenforceable on the 
facts. The former is an agreement which obliges the defendant to negotiate exclusively with the 
plaintiff, while the latter is an agreement under which the defendant agrees not to continue 
negotiation with third parties but assumes no positive obligation to negotiate with the plaintiff.321 
The reason for the holding the lock-out agreement unenforceable was that it was not of a fixed 
duration; this was a defect that is curable by more careful drafting.322 On the other hand, the 
lock-in agreement was held to be inherently unenforceable therefore it was not a matter of 
drafting deficiencies.323 It was a question of law and the English law did not recognize the 
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existence of an obligation to negotiate in good faith, this was said to be so for reasons of 
certainty and policy.324 The policy reasons were clearly set out by Lord Ackner when he stated: 
‘The concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the 
adversial position of the parties involved in negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is 
entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so long as he avoids making 
misrepresentations.’325 
Furthermore, Lord Ackner concluded that: 
‘A duty to negotiate in good faith is as unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent 
with the position of a negotiating party.’326  
However the English Law position on good faith has changed somewhat since the Watford 
case as parties have increasingly included express good faith terms in their contracts. In the 
absence of such an agreed term, scholars have remained divided on whether a party must be 
contractually obligated to contract in good faith.327 Yhe Yam Seng case is regarded as having set 
precedence on implied good faith in English contract law.328 
(ii) The current English position on good faith 
The position of good faith in English contract law is said to have taken ‘a substantial leap 
forward’ since the days when it was totally ignored.329 The current status of the concept was 
summarized in the case of Yam Seng case330 where it was stated that: 
‘Under English Law a duty of good faith is implied by law as an incident of certain 
categories of contract, for example contracts of employment and contracts between partners 
or others whose relationship is characterised as a fiduciary one. I doubt that English law has 
reached the stage, however, where it is ready to recognise a requirement of good faith as a 
duty implied by law, even as a default rule, into all commercial contracts. Nevertheless, there 
seems to me to be no difficulty, following the established methodology of English law for 
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the implications of terms in fact, in implying such a duty in any ordinary commercial 
contract based on the presumed intention of the parties.’331 
After the Yam Seng case, the English courts have reaffirmed that terms such as good faith 
will only be implied into complex commercial arrangements in specific and fairly limited 
circumstances and will not be done where such an implied term potentially contradicts an 
express term or is rendered unnecessary the express terms. 332  Bingham LJ argues that this 
cautious approach to the concept of good faith in English law can be attributed to three factors. 
First, the preferred method of English law is to ‘proceed incrementally by fashioning particular 
solutions in response to problems rather than by enforcing broad overarching principles.’333 This 
argument is also said to have contributed to the reason why English courts have not defined the 
concept of good faith and have rather preferred to work on a case-by-case basis.334 Even though 
a definite meaning of good faith had not been reached, the English courts have nevertheless 
proclaimed what they perceive to be the principles included in the concept of good faith. This 
point was expressed in the CPC Group case,335 when it was concluded that an obligation to act in 
‘utmost good faith’ included the requirement to: 
‘…adhere to the spirit of the contract…and to observe reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing, and to be faithful to the agreed common purpose, and to act consistently with 
the justified expectations of the parties.’336 
It is argued that a further reason for the reluctance is that English law is said to embody an 
‘ethos of individualism’, by which the parties are free to pursue their own self-interest both in 
negotiation and in performing contracts on the condition that they do not act in breach of a term 
of the contract.337 The third reason given is the fear that ‘recognising a general requirement of 
good faith in the performance of the contracts would create too much uncertainty.’ This is based 
on a concern that the content of the obligation would be vague and subjective and therefore it is 
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argued that its adoption would undermine the goal of contractual certainty to which English law 
has always attached great weight.338  
(iii) England and the CISG  
Lord Steyn argues that adopting an objective approach to contractual obligations has made 
England a somewhat ‘infertile soil’ for the development of a generalized contractual duty of 
good faith.339 However Zeller argues that two developments may force this position to change: 
‘First, since the United Kingdom appear to be on the verge of ratifying the CISG, which has 
adopted the concept of good faith, although in an arguably deficient manner, may compel 
England to take a different approach since it is argued that the good faith concept as contained in 
article 7 (1) can be extended to the interpretation of domestic contracts. Secondly, the impact of 
the European Community Directives, which in part touch on the concept of good faith, is likely 
to force the English courts and lawyers to confront the meaning of good faith and thereby have 
an enthusiastic approach to its application.’340 
This brief examination of national laws and its treatment of good faith demonstrate two 
things; firstly, there are contrasting opinions, even within one jurisdiction, on the definition of 
the concept thus scholars argue that it can be given meaning by identifying the principles on 
which it is based.341 Secondly, each country applies the concept of good faith differently.342  
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
At the start of this dissertation the question was asked whether uniformity in the meaning 
and application of good faith in international commercial transactions can be achieved. This 
dissertation concludes that such uniformity is possible however certain obstacles have to be 
addressed that have prevented a uniform adoption of the concept in international trade to date.  
Firstly one of the obstacles that prevent the attainment of such uniformity is that the 
meaning of good faith changes depending on the context in which it is used.343 Arguably such 
changes on the basis of context may be unavoidable because of the elusive nature of good faith. 
However this dissertation argues that consistency in the meaning of the good faith in 
international trade instruments can nevertheless be achieved. This dissertation argues that such 
uniformity can be attained by finding a definition of good faith based on the fundamental 
principles it is based, such as fairness and honesty, instead of adopting strict and exclusive 
definitions in international trade instruments. 
 Secondly attaining uniformity in the application of good faith in national laws and 
international trade instruments is a similarly daunting task. This is largely because good faith is 
applied in different parts of commercial transactions thus it occupies different functions in 
contracting. For example most European civil codes apply pre-contractual good faith while 
others use the concept to validate the contract itself.344  Similarly good faith application in 
international trade instruments has different dimensions ranging from having a role in 
interpretation regulating the contractual relationship of the parties. The attainment of uniformity 
in application of good faith in international trade instruments is possible. This dissertation argues 
such uniformity can be attained. 
The third and perhaps the hardest challenge to attaining uniformity in the meaning and 
application of good faith in international trade instruments has to do with gap filling by courts 
and tribunals with reference to national laws. The practice of gap filling with reference to 
national laws has had a significant role in international trade.345 The importance of gap filling 
with on the basis of good faith was noted by Pargendler stating that: 
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‘…at the core of the gap-filling nature of the doctrine of good faith is the idea of preventing a 
party from taking advantage of gaps…In determining whether there is a gap, courts pay 
special attention to the characteristic of the deals in question and fill them accordingly.’346 
 Although the practice of gap filling on the basis of good faith has a seemingly important 
role in international commercial transaction transactions, this dissertation concludes that such 
practice defeats the goal of maintaining the ‘international character’ of trade instruments. Thus 
the solution to the problem should involve obviating the need for gap filling. 
Gap filling can perhaps be obviated by drafting clear good faith provisions in trade 
instruments. This will arguably reduce the need for courts and tribunals to make reference to 
national laws and thereby increase the dependency on the good faith provisions of such 
instruments.  
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